Third, loyalty is not a case of manipulation or false consciousness. If genocide is one of the greatest crimes of which humanity is capable, then people must justifiably be able to resist it when it is imposed upon their kind. Extinction is the worst of evils that can befall a kind, and those that sacrifice some present self-interest out of loyalty should receive the highest moral praise for their efforts at avoiding this greatest of evils. In fact, altruistic self-sacrifice is often considered the essence of morality. Again, if a member of an ethnic group stays in a neighborhood, state, or country out of loyalty, when moving might be better from self-interest, this is a moral act of the highest order. Instead, there is a natural existential imperative demanding loyalty to ones kind when loyalty is necessary for any kind to persist. When threatened with genocide those groups whose members do not demonstrate loyalty go extinct, and so the prevention is genocidal.

There are three kinds of loyalty that correspond to the factors discussed in parts 2 – 4: loyalty to ones people, loyalty to ones ethnic, religious, and cultural traditions, and loyalty to place. There may be other important kinds of loyalty, such as institutional loyalty–loyalty to ones teammates, partners, family, leader, military commander, and so on—but it is these three types that are genocide-resistant.

Thus society needs to gain new respect for loyalty and the loyal, and a new disdain for the traitorous as loyalty is the highest of virtues as it avoids the greatest of calamities. Disloyalty, as was traditionally claimed, is the worst of vices; Dante condemned the traitorous to the lowest level of hell. A full discussion of how the disloyal should be treated, and what, if any, the penalty should be for disloyalty, is beyond the scope of this post. But several general points could be made. How to produce loyalty is an ancient problem. Perhaps disloyalty should be illegal. But it seems grossly extreme to charge someone as a traitor who, say, chooses to not bring their child up in their traditional faith. On the other hand, being a traitor to ones country is generally considered a great offense and is punishable with the most severe penalty, even death. In between state enforcement and unfettered license lay social pressure and stigma, and this seems a far more reasonable way to treat certain kinds of disloyalty: the disloyal should be ostracized and shamed the way the Amish or Hasidim do.